

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 108499
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:GSCOTT:AB
APPROVED BY AF:RMOOSE
EUR/REP:ROHOMME
AF/S:DKEOGH
S/S-O:T MARTIN

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O R 280223Z APR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
USINT HAVANA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

S E C R E T STATE 108499

EXDIS BRUSSELS FOR USEEC
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PAGE 02 STATE 108499

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: RH, SO, SF, WA, AO, KE, SU, EEC

SUBJECT: US/EC PRESIDENCY DIALOGUE: AFRICAN ISSUES

I. AMBASSADOR BORCH IN HIS EC PRESIDENCY CAPACITY CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD MOOSE APRIL 26 TO DISCUSS US PERCEPTIONS OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE HORN. MR. MOOSE SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONTACT GROUP'S PROPOSALS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RESOLUTION 385 WAS A HEARTENING SIGN BOTH IN THE NAMIBIA CONTEXT AND AS A PORTENT FOR PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA. THE QUESTION OF THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF WALVIS BAY REMAINED A POTENTIAL STUMBLING BLOCK. THE USG WAS ULTIMATEDLY PREPARED TO ARGUE THAT FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS WALVIS BAY SHOULD BECOME PART OF NAMIBIA AND WE DOUBTED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS, WHATEVER THEIR LEGAL POSITION, REALLY BELIEVED THAT THE CONTRARY WAS LIKELY. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT A QUESTION THAT COULD BE DECIDED NOW; IF SWAPO WERE TO STICK AT THE QUESTION, IT WOULD, CONSCIOUSLY OR UNCONSCIOUSLY, BE AN EXCUSE FOR NOT GOING FORWARD WITH THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. NJOMO AND THE SWAPO PEOPLE MIGHT WELL LACK THE POLITICAL WILL TO MAKE THE SORT OF DECISION THAT SOUTH AFRICA, IN ACCEPTING THE CONTACT GROUP'S PROPOSALS, HAD JUST MADE. IF SWAPO MISSED THIS OPPORTUNITY THERE MIGHT

BE SOME SPLIT IN THE AFRICAN GROUP AT THE UN. IT WOULD BE HARD TO IMAGINE ANY OF THE AFRICAN GROUP GOING AGAINST SWAPO BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WAS ALMOST UNIVERSAL AFRICAN GROUP SUPPORT FOR THE CONTACT GROUP
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PROPOSALS. THE ANGOLANS, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN PUSHING A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA WHICH WOULD MOVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS AWAY FROM THEIR BORDER. THIS QUESTION WOULD BE A REAL TEST OF THE OAU ABILITY TO FUNCTION.

2. IT WAS MR. MOOSE'S OPINION THAT IF THE CONTACT GROUP'S PROPOSALS WERE TO BREAK DOWN, SOUTH AFRICA WOULD LIBERATE NAMIBIA IN ITS OWN WAY AND WITHOUT UN PARTICIPATION. WE HAD NO CLEAR VIEW OF WHAT THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF NAMIBIA WOULD BE AS A RESULT OF A FREE ELECTION. IT WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER SWAPO WAS ABLE TO COORDINATE AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL EFFORT. ONE WOULD EXPECT THE TURNHALLE ALLIANCE TO DO VERY WELL. IF SO, SWAPO WOULD CRY FOUL, BUT MR. MOOSE DOUBTED THAT THEY WOULD GET VERY MUCH SYMPATHY FROM THE FRONT LINE STATES IF THEY HAD GONE THAT FAR AND THEN CHOSEN TO OBJECT TO THE RESULTS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

3. EVEN SHOULD SWAPO REJECT THE SETTLEMENT, MR. MOOSE BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE GAINED

CONSIDERABLE CREDIBILITY IN AFRICA BY MOVING SOUTH
AFRICA AS FAR AS IT HAS COME.

4. RHODESIA: IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, MR. MOOSE SAID
THAT WE HAVE A GENERAL SENSE SITHOLE AND MUZOREWA ARE
THE MOST STRONGLY OPPOSED TO AN ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE,
SINCE ANY CHANGE WILL DIMINISH THEIR POSITION. NONE-
THELESS, SMITH, THE RHODESIA FRONT, AND SOUTH AFRICA
MAY SUPPORT AN ALL PARTY'S CONFERENCE AND MR. MOOSE
THOUGH ONE COULD BE HELD IN MAY. THE REPORTS WE HAVE
RECEIVED FROM THE MORE THOUGHTFUL AND OBJECTIVE OBSERV-
ERS OF RHODESIA EXPRESS DOUBT THAT THE SALISBURY
ARREEMENTS WILL BE EASILY IMPLEMENTED. ALREADY THERE
ARE SIGNS OF STRAIN, AND THE BLACKS REQUIRE-VISIBLE
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PAGE 04 STATE 108499

EVIDENCE OF CHANGE, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENT GOVERNMENT
WILLINGNESS TO MAKE THE NECESSARY MOVES. IT MAY BE
THAT THE RHODESIAN FRONT CANNOT GO TO ELECTIONS BY
DECEMBER 31. MEANWHILE, ALTHOUGH AMERICAN OPINION
TENDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IS
REASONABLE, THE ADMINISTRATION STILL HAS SOME MANEUVER-
ING ROOM WHICH IT HOPES TO MAINTAIN.

5. MR. MOOSE NOTED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD BEEN
MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN CREDIT FOR.
THEY HAD ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A RESIDENT COMMIS-
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STILL, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN WAS NOT DEAD. IT WAS
RATHER LIKE MAE WEST, IT HAD BEEN RETIRED A NUMBER OF
TIMES BUT IT WAS STILL AROUND.

6. MR. MOOSE SAID THERE WAS SOME DIVISION BETWEEN
NKOMO AND MUGABE NOW. THEY HAD BEEN LIKE SIAMESE TWINS
AT MALTA, BUT THERE WAS A DISCERNABLE DIFFERENCE IN
THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT US OBJEC-
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7. MR. MOOSE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS
CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROSPECT THAT CUBANS MIGHT BECOME
INVOLVED IN RHODESIA. HOWEVER, THE FRONT LINE STATES
DID NOT WANT THEM THERE SO LONG AS WE PROVIDED A
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8. THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE UNITED STATES AND PRESI-
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9. MR. MOOSE SAID AMERICA'S INTERESTS WOULD BEST BE SERVED IN THE LONG RUN BY CONTINUING TO CARRY OUT A SENSIBLE PROGRESSIVE POLICY, THOUGH THE CUBAN AND SOVIET PRESENCE WOULD INVOLVE A CONTAINMENT EFFORT FROM TIME TO TIME, IN THIS CASE CONVINCING KENYA TO WORRY ABOUT THE SOVIETS AT LEAST AS MUCH AS ABOUT THE SOMALIS, AND REASSURING THE SUDANESE. OUR ULTIMATE WESTERN ASSET WAS OUR ABILITY TO HELP THE AFRICAN STATES ADVANCE ECONOMICALLY. MR. MOOSE DISCERNED INCREASING AFRICAN CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, BUT THEY CONSTANTLY EXAMINED US. WE HAD SUFFERED NO MAJOR SETBACKS YET, AND IF WE CONTINUED TO ARTICULATE OUR POSITIONS PROPERLY, PERHAPS WE COULD CONTINUE TO PROGRESS.
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PAGE 01 STATE 108499
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011
DRAFTED BY:EUR/RPM:TMSAVAGE
APPROVED BY:EUR:MPARRIS
EUR/RPM:SJLEDOGAR
S/S/O:SGOLDSMITH
AF/E:GSCOTT
AF/S:DKEOGH

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P 290510Z APR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 108499

EXDIS

FOL STATE 108499 SENT ACTION COPENHAGEN INFO LONDON PARIS
ROME BONN DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE BRUSSELS MOGADISCIO
HAVANA ADDIS ABABA NAIROBI KHARTOUM LAGOS PRETORIA
CAPE TOWN GABORONE MAPUTO LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM APR 28, 1978
REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
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Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, UNSC RESOLUTIONS, WALVIS BAY
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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Original Previous Classification: n/a
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